



FULLERFIELD CAPITAL Regenerative Agriculture Fund

FULLERFIELD INSIGHTS · APRIL 2026

The Northeast Food System Crisis

Quantifying a \$2.3 billion financing gap across farm succession, processing infrastructure, and regenerative CPG growth — and the capital strategy to close it.

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Regional food systems don't fail for lack of markets. They fail for lack of the right capital, in the right form, at the right moment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The case for regional food-system debt capital

The nine-state Northeast — New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the six New England states — sits on top of a regional food economy whose output is measured in hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Farm Credit East estimates the combined agriculture, commercial fishing, forest-products and food-manufacturing industries generate roughly \$220 billion of economic activity and support more than 800,000 jobs across the region. And yet the producers, processors, and brands that make this system work cannot access capital at the scale, tenor, or flexibility their businesses require.

Fullerfield Capital's research puts the cumulative, unmet demand for growth-stage debt capital across the Northeast's regenerative food and agriculture businesses at **\$2.3 billion**. This gap sits in three specific places: farm succession (\$940M), regional processing and cold-chain infrastructure (\$780M), and working-and-growth capital for regenerative consumer-packaged-goods brands (\$580M). Each is large enough to matter on its own. Together they define the central capital question facing the Northeast food system over the coming decade.

The gap is not a story of weak demand. Consumer spending on organic food grew 5.2% in 2024 and 6.8% in 2025 to a record \$76.6 billion nationally (OTA). Regenerative-claim CPG — a smaller but faster-growing cohort — has compounded at ~30% annually. New England's food, beverage, and alcohol expenditures exceed \$120 billion per year, yet only 3.1% of that spending is currently directed at local or regional product (NEFNE). The demand-side machinery is working; the capital-side is not.

The three-part gap — at a glance

Succession (\$940M): Sixty percent of Northeast farmers are approaching retirement, putting roughly \$50B of regional farmland and infrastructure into transition over the coming decade (American Farmland Trust).

Infrastructure (\$780M): Regional meat, dairy, and produce processors operate below the scale and modernization threshold their customers now require; cold-chain capacity is concentrated around metro distribution nodes rather than farm origin.

CPG Growth (\$580M): Regenerative CPG brands with traction — sub-\$25M in revenue — face 60-to-90-day cash-conversion cycles and \$50K–\$500K working-capital gaps that conventional lenders will not underwrite.

Fullerfield Capital was founded to close this gap with **flexible senior and mezzanine debt** — the capital form that is missing, not equity. Equity exists for this market, but dilutes farmers and founders whose entire economic thesis depends on owner-operator control. Grants exist through the Fullerfield Foundation and peer philanthropic sources, but grants cannot scale to a \$2.3B problem. Debt, appropriately structured, can.

This report sets out the evidence, the bottoms-up model behind the \$2.3B figure, the capital-stack logic that makes Fullerfield's instruments defensible, and a ten-year projection for how the gap closes under three scenarios.

Headline Numbers & Report Structure

Ten data points that define the opportunity

\$2.3B

Cumulative Northeast financing gap, 2026–2036

\$220B

Regional ag + food economy (Farm Credit East, 2022)

60%

Share of Northeast farmers near retirement

\$50B

Regional farmland and infrastructure in transition

6.8%

2025 growth in U.S. organic sales (OTA)

3.1%

New England food spend going to regional product today

\$76.6B

U.S. organic sales, 2025 — a new record

\$50K–\$500K

Typical regenerative-CPG working-capital gap

~\$80B

Northeast regional food economy by common framing

What's in this report

I. Regional context — framing the 9-state food economy Fullerfield invests into. **II. The succession cliff** — why \$940M is required to keep regenerative farmland in farming hands. **III. Infrastructure & cold chain** — why \$780M of private capital is needed despite recent federal funding. **IV. The CPG capital wall** — the \$580M working- and growth-capital gap for emerging regenerative brands. **V. Gap methodology** — how we reconcile to \$2.3B from the bottom up. **VI. Demand tailwinds** — consumer, retail, and policy drivers. **VII. Capital strategy** — why senior/mezz debt is the missing instrument. **VIII. Term framework** — indicative product set across the three segments. **IX. Projections** — base, mixed, and accelerated cases through 2036. **X. Risk framework**. **XI. The Fullerfield approach** — Capital + Foundation integrated. **Appendix**.

A note on scope and methodology


Geographic scope follows the U.S. Census Northeast — Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Financial figures are in 2025 USD unless noted. Segment estimates combine USDA NASS 2022 Census of Agriculture, USDA Economic Research Service cash-receipts data, Farm Credit East 2024 industry reports, American Farmland Trust succession research, New England Feeding New England scenarios, Organic Trade Association 2025 Market Report, and Fullerfield's own deal-pipeline observations. All projections are illustrative and do not constitute an offer, solicitation, or return commitment.

I. REGIONAL CONTEXT

The 9-state food economy Fullerfield invests into

The Northeast is often misread as a consumer region rather than a production region. The reality is both: the nine-state footprint contains the country's densest concentration of affluent, food-literate consumers *and* a working agricultural base of roughly 121,000 farms and more than 28 million acres in production (USDA Census of Agriculture, 2022). Fourteen metropolitan areas of 500,000+ residents sit within a day's refrigerated drive of that farmland.

That proximity creates a market reality that does not exist in most U.S. regions: regenerative farms and food businesses can reach meaningful scale without having to truck product 1,500 miles or negotiate with a consolidated national distributor to reach retail. New York City alone consumes ~\$40 billion of food and beverage annually; Boston, Philadelphia, and the DC-adjacent New Jersey corridor each add another tier of demand. The opportunity is a value-chain one — the margin the region currently hands to extra-regional producers and processors is the margin Fullerfield's borrowers compete for.



Farm count (USDA Census of Agriculture, 2022) and estimated acres entering succession/transition through 2036 by state. NY and PA dominate absolute volume; Maine and Vermont carry the highest transition intensity per capita.


What makes the Northeast structurally different

Three structural features shape the capital need. First, the region's farms are smaller than the national average — median ~90 acres against a U.S. median closer to 180 — which means transitions and expansions involve unit economics traditional ag lenders are not set up to serve. Second, the region's product mix is heavily skewed to dairy, specialty crops, and value-added food manufacturing, categories where *processing* margin is where regional value is either captured or ceded. Third, land values in the Northeast sit well above the national average — Pennsylvania cropland at \$9,560/acre and New Jersey pasture at \$15,000/acre in 2024 (USDA NASS) — making succession-stage financing a materially different underwriting problem than in the Midwest or Plains.

II. THE SUCCESSION CLIFF — \$940M

Sixty percent of Northeast farmers are within a decade of retirement

Succession is the single largest component of the Northeast financing gap, and it is the most time-bounded. USDA's 2022 Census of Agriculture put the national average producer age at 58.1 years. In the Northeast the picture is sharper: fifty-seven percent of producers are 55 or older, and the number of producers age 65+ grew 12% between 2017 and 2022. American Farmland Trust has estimated that roughly 370 million acres of U.S. agricultural land will change hands over the next two decades, and that the Northeast alone has approximately \$50 billion of farmland and on-farm infrastructure entering transition.



U.S. Farm Producers by Age Bracket, 2022 Census of Agriculture. Northeast producer ages track the national curve closely; 57% are 55+. Source: USDA NASS.

Why this becomes a capital problem, not a succession-planning problem

Succession is failing at capital, not at intent. Exiting farmers overwhelmingly prefer for the next generation to continue operating — American Farmland Trust's 'Farms for a New Generation' research has documented this repeatedly — but fewer than 30% of Northeast farms with operators over 65 have an identified, capitalized successor. The constraint is that beginning farmers cannot assemble a purchase-or-lease-to-own capital stack within traditional lending.

At \$5,000–\$15,000 per acre depending on state and land type, and with livestock, equipment, and transition working capital added, a meaningful Northeast farm transition requires \$800,000 to \$4,500,000 in committed capital. USDA Farm Service Agency direct and guaranteed loan limits, while essential, are capped at \$600,000 per borrower for farm ownership loans. Conventional ag banks underwrite to debt-service-coverage ratios that assume conventional commodity yields, not regenerative cash flows. Philanthropy and conservation easements can reduce the land basis, but cannot finance the operating transition. The space between these instruments is where the \$940M sits.

II. SUCCESSION (cont.)

How we get to \$940M — the bottoms-up reconciliation

Fullerfield's \$940M succession estimate is the residual demand after existing capital sources are drawn down to their realistic ceilings. Starting from the AFT \$50B transitioning-asset estimate for the Northeast, we scope the model to the decadal financing window (2026–2036), the regenerative-eligible subset of transitions, and the financing gap net of conventional and public sources.

Driver	Estimate	Basis
Northeast acres in transition, 10-yr window	3.3M acres	28M acres × 60% aging producers × (10/20-yr horizon)
Weighted avg. all-in asset value per acre	\$7,000	USDA NASS 2024 state averages, weighted by acreage
Gross transitioning asset value (10-yr)	\$23.1B	Row 1 × Row 2
Regenerative-eligible subset	12.5%	Organic+transitioning acreage share, USDA/NESAWG
Regenerative-eligible asset value	\$2.89B	Row 3 × Row 4
Less: owner equity roll-over	(\$0.72B)	~25% equity retention in a typical succession
Less: conventional senior debt capacity	(\$1.30B)	FSA + ag-bank capacity at max sustainable DSCR
Plus: bridge & operating transition capital	\$0.07B	Livestock, equipment, working capital during handoff
Residual financing gap — succession	\$940M	Fullerfield estimate, 2026–2036

The model is deliberately conservative on two fronts. We cap the regenerative-eligible share at 12.5% (against a 15–18% upside view if policy tailwinds materialize), and we assume conventional senior debt lenders underwrite at their historical ceilings rather than their stated ceilings. We also exclude non-regenerative transitions — where commodity agriculture is simply sold into consolidation — from the gap figure, because those transitions do not represent Fullerfield's deployable opportunity.

Ticket-size expectations: individual succession transactions range from \$350K (a leased-to-owned pasture-poultry operation) to \$6.5M (a multi-family dairy or multi-generational vegetable farm). The median Fullerfield-eligible succession deal is approximately \$1.6M, implying roughly 580 financeable transactions across the decade.

III. INFRASTRUCTURE & COLD CHAIN — \$780M

The middle of the supply chain is where regional value is either captured or ceded

Regenerative farms can grow good product. Consumers will buy regenerative product. The bottleneck sits between them: the region lacks the processing, aggregation, and cold-chain capacity to move farm-gate product into retail and foodservice at regenerative margins. This is the middle-of-the-supply-chain gap that USDA's \$420M Resilient Food Systems Infrastructure Program was designed to address nationally — and that federal dollar meaningfully moves the needle, but does not close it.

The Northeast's infrastructure deficit is concentrated in four places: small and mid-scale meat and poultry processing; dairy value-add (cheese, yogurt, cultured products, fluid-milk co-packing); produce aggregation and IQF/frozen; and regional cold storage located near farms rather than near interstate nodes.

Segment	Facilities / Need	Gap (\$M)
Meat & poultry processing (small/mid)	~200 facilities requiring modernization or new builds	\$300M
Dairy value-added (cheese, yogurt, cultured, co-pack)	~45 co-packing & processing expansions	\$120M
Produce aggregation, IQF & frozen	~25 regional aggregators + IQF lines	\$150M
Regional cold-storage hubs	4–6 farm-proximate hubs at ~\$35M each	\$170M
Last-mile refrigerated distribution	Fleet, satellite cross-docks	\$40M
Total — Infrastructure & cold chain		\$780M

III. INFRASTRUCTURE (cont.)

Why public funding helps — and why private debt is still required

USDA's Resilient Food Systems Infrastructure Program allocated \$420M nationally; the Northeast Regional Food Business Center has administered an incremental \$10M round in partnership with New York State. The Meat and Poultry Processing Expansion Program (MPPEP) and Local Meat Capacity Grant Program add another \$110M nationally, with individual grants from \$390K to \$10M. A reasonable estimate of total public infrastructure capital flowing to the Northeast through 2026 is \$160–\$190M.

This public funding is necessary but not close to sufficient. Three reasons. First, grants rarely cover more than 35–50% of project cost — the operator still has to raise the balance. Second, the grants are competitive, slow, and arrive on federal budget cycles that do not match construction timelines. Third, grant funding does not finance working capital: a cheese facility can have its building and equipment paid for and still fail for lack of the \$2–4M of dairy-supply working capital required to run it at design throughput.

Fullerfield's infrastructure underwriting is designed to sit alongside public capital, not compete with it. In a typical regional cold-storage or processing deal, the capital stack runs approximately 20–35% operator equity, 40–50% conventional senior or SBA 504 debt, 8–15% grants or program-related investment, and a 15–25% Fullerfield mezzanine or flexible-senior tranche. That tranche is what turns a conceptually-financeable project into a closeable one.

Federal policy matters — but it is a floor, not a ceiling

Public programs like RFSI, MPPEP, Local MCap, and state-level analogs (e.g., New York's partnership with the Farm and Food Growth Fund) are essential. They are also cyclical, subject to appropriation politics, and concentrated on equipment and facilities rather than working capital. Private debt capital is what operationalizes the public investment. The \$780M infrastructure gap is the residual after public capital is fully drawn.

IV. THE CPG CAPITAL WALL — \$580M

Regenerative brands hit a wall at the exact point demand is strongest

Regenerative consumer-packaged-goods brands — grass-fed dairy, pasture-raised meats, regeneratively-sourced cereals and snacks, functional beverages with sustainable supply chains — have been the fastest-growing cohort in natural foods for five consecutive years. The ReGen Brands Coalition, launched in 2024, organized 31 founding brands; by early 2026 that ecosystem encompassed more than 140 Northeast-relevant brands with \$5M–\$50M in revenue. SPINS and New Hope Network data show regenerative-claim sales compounding at ~30% annually off a small base.


And yet: the fundraising environment for emerging natural brands is the worst it has been in a decade. Growth-equity capital has retreated to Series C+ checks. Commercial banks will not lend against inventory for brands sub-\$15M in revenue. Asset-based lenders charge rates that eat the margin the brand was raising capital to build. The mismatch between market pull and capital supply is the \$580M gap.

Component	Scope	Gap (\$M)
Inventory & working capital	~600 NE brands × \$350K avg across a cycle	\$210M
Co-packing & shared production capital	Equipment and tooling for 40–50 shared lines	\$90M
Trade-spend & retail launch bridge	Slotting, promotions, and 60–90 day receivables	\$120M
Growth capex (own facility, line expansion)	30–50 brands crossing the make-vs-buy line	\$160M
Total — CPG growth capital		\$580M

The 60-to-90 day cash-conversion cycle is the dominant operational fact for these brands. Natural-channel retailers pay on Net 60. Whole Foods and Sprouts pay on Net 30 but assess slotting and promotional commitments that re-extend the cycle. Co-manufacturers typically require 50% deposits to schedule runs. Dairy and meat inputs are paid within 7–14 days. The result is that a \$12M-revenue brand with 22% operating margin can still run out of cash in an expansion quarter — not because the business is unhealthy but because the capital structure doesn't fit the cycle.

V. RECONCILING TO \$2.3B

The three-segment model, visualized



The \$2.3 billion Northeast financing gap split across three segments — Fullerfield research, 2026. Segment estimates based on USDA, regional ag census, and proprietary portfolio data.


The \$2.3B figure is the result of a bottoms-up reconciliation, not a top-down claim. Each segment is modeled independently from public data and Fullerfield's deal-pipeline observations, then summed. Where public estimates exist, we cross-walk to them: for succession, our figure sits inside AFT's broader \$50B transitioning-asset estimate and is reconciled to the regenerative-eligible subset; for infrastructure, our figure is consistent with USDA RFSI's nationally-scaled need when regionalized; for CPG, our figure is consistent with ReGen Brands Capital's public framing that the emerging-brand capital gap is a multi-billion-dollar problem.

Segment	Gap (2026–2036)	Share	Primary Sources
Farm Succession	\$940M	41%	USDA NASS, AFT, Farm Credit East
Infrastructure & Cold Chain	\$780M	34%	USDA AMS/RFSI, NESAWG, Wallace Center
CPG Growth Capital	\$580M	25%	OTA, ReGen Brands, SPINS
Total	\$2,300M	100%	Fullerfield research, 2026

Two reasonable questions: why not larger, and why not smaller? Larger: we exclude commodity-agriculture transitions that will happen but will not be regeneratively capitalized; we exclude the \$50B+ of supply-chain capital required to decarbonize food manufacturing at scale; and we exclude residential farmstead transitions that are not commercial. Smaller: we do not net out capital that is technically available but practically inaccessible — e.g., community bank SBA 504 lines that exist on paper but are rarely underwritten for regenerative agriculture. These exclusions produce a conservative figure that survives stress-testing.

VI. DEMAND-SIDE TAILWINDS

Why this is a capital problem, not a market problem



U.S. organic sales reached \$76.6B in 2025 (OTA); regenerative-claim CPG is on a steeper curve from a smaller base. Projections beyond 2025 assume 6.5% organic CAGR and ~28% regenerative CAGR, stepped down from recent rates.

Three demand forces are converging. First, consumer: 75% of U.S. shoppers bought a natural or organic product in the last six months (Acosta Group, 2025), and 59% cite synthetic-chemical avoidance as 'important.' Second, retail: the entire natural channel — Whole Foods, Sprouts, Erewhon, Fresh Market, a growing independent cohort — has re-prioritized regional and regenerative sourcing since the 2022–2023 supply-chain shocks. Third, policy: New England Feeding New England's 30-by-30 target implies increasing regional food share from 3.1% to 30%, a ~10× shift.

From a Fullerfield capital-deployment perspective, these tailwinds matter in two specific ways. They support revenue growth assumptions in our underwriting (a 28% CAGR in regenerative-claim volume will not continue indefinitely, but provides cushion against down-cases). And they support exit liquidity: a regenerative CPG brand that grows from \$8M to \$30M in revenue in five years has a functioning strategic-buyer market today that did not exist in 2015–2018.


Demand is sufficient. Capital is not.

The defining question for the 2026–2036 Northeast food system is not whether consumers will buy regeneratively-produced food — they already do, and at accelerating rates. It is whether the right capital will be in place for producers, processors, and brands to meet that demand with the right product, at the right place, at the right margin. That is an investable question.

VII. CAPITAL STRATEGY

Why flexible debt is the missing instrument

Fullerfield Capital's thesis is narrow and testable: across all three segments of the Northeast gap, the binding constraint is *the form of capital*, not the existence of capital. Equity, grants, and conventional senior debt are each plentiful in the region. Each is also structurally mismatched to the underwriting reality of regenerative food and agriculture businesses. Flexible debt — senior with covenants that match farm and food-business cash cycles, or mezzanine that sits between senior and owner equity — is the tranche that makes deals close.



Illustrative capital stacks across the three segments Fullerfield serves. In each case, Fullerfield's flexible tranche is the piece that completes a stack otherwise stuck at conceptual stage.

Why not equity?

Equity requires control and exit economics that do not work for owner-operator farms and founder-led regenerative brands. A dairy farm with a 4% EBIT margin cannot deliver venture returns; its owner cannot accept the dilution required to attract venture-style capital. Founder-led CPG brands are increasingly unwilling to trade dilution for growth capital when non-dilutive structures exist.

Why not conventional senior debt alone?

Commercial banks and Farm Credit associations are important partners but are bounded by debt-service-coverage ratios and collateral requirements that do not accommodate transition-year cash flow, regenerative yield curves, or inventory cycles for seasonal food. Their senior-secured position is also often too senior — they need a subordinated capital layer beneath them to underwrite at all.

Why not grants?

The Fullerfield Foundation's sister role is exactly this: grants and technical assistance unlock the investment-readiness that makes debt capital deployable. Grants cannot scale to a \$2.3B problem, but they can make a \$2.3B problem *financeable*.

VIII. INDICATIVE TERM FRAMEWORK

Three product lines mapped to three segments

The product architecture below is illustrative of Fullerfield Capital's underwriting approach; specific deal terms are borrower-dependent and are not commitments. The consistent feature across all three products is tenor and structure designed around agricultural and food-business cash cycles rather than imported from corporate or commercial-real-estate conventions.


Product	Succession (Farm Ownership)	Infrastructure (Processing & Cold)	CPG Growth (Working + Expansion)
Ticket size	\$500K – \$5M	\$1M – \$8M	\$250K – \$3M
Instrument	Flexible senior (blended w/ FSA guarantee)	Mezzanine subordinated to SBA 504 / bank senior	Revenue-linked senior or asset-based revolver
Tenor	15–25 years	7–12 years	3–5 years
Rate posture	Below market, patience-adjusted	At market, risk-adjusted	At market, structure-adjusted
Amortization	Interest-only years 1–3, then graduated	Interest-only during construction + ramp	Monthly tied to receivables cycle
Key covenants	DSCR, land-use, regenerative practices	Throughput, third-party grants drawn	A/R cover, inventory, retailer concentration
Equity stack alongside	25–40% owner + FSA	20–35% owner + SBA	35–50% owner + retained
Role of grant capital	Easements, working capital bridge	Equipment cost share, energy efficiency	De-risking pilots, technical assistance

The Fullerfield underwriting posture

We underwrite to cash flow, not to commodity price-cycle comps. We require a regenerative practices covenant in every transaction. We originate in partnership with the Fullerfield Foundation's 12-to-18-month technical-assistance cohort, which materially improves deal readiness. We co-lend with Farm Credit associations, community banks, and CDFIs wherever possible — expanding the pool of senior capital rather than displacing it.

IX. TEN-YEAR PROJECTIONS

How the gap closes — or fails to — through 2036



Cumulative capital deployed against the \$2.3B gap under three scenarios. The dashed line marks the gap threshold. Base case reaches 79% of gap by 2036; mixed case closes it by 2033; accelerated case by 2032.

Fullerfield models three scenarios for how the \$2.3B gap closes. Each assumes continued public policy support at current authorization levels, a 28% annual growth in regenerative-claim CPG decelerating toward 15% by 2036, and no material macroeconomic dislocation.

Base case — business as usual.

Public grant flows (\$135–185M/yr across USDA RFSI, Local MCap, MPPEP, state-level analogs, and philanthropic funders), combined with conventional senior debt that participates at its current ceiling, closes roughly \$1.82B of the gap by 2036 — 79% of target. The residual — succession transactions that don't pencil at FSA limits, CPG brands that fail to scale, processing facilities that remain at sub-scale — represents lost regional capacity that is unlikely to be recovered.

Mixed case — Fullerfield-plus-partners scale.

A Fullerfield Capital vehicle deploying \$35–70M annually at maturity, combined with co-lenders in Farm Credit, community banking, and CDFI channels it catalyzes, and with Foundation-mediated grant-to-investment pipeline, closes the full \$2.3B gap by 2033 and an incremental \$460M of expansion demand by 2036. This is the scenario that underpins Fullerfield's current capital-raise framing.

IX. PROJECTIONS (cont.)

Five-year Fullerfield base-plan economics

Fullerfield Capital's own five-year plan is the inner layer of the mixed-case scenario. The Foundation's five-year vision — supporting 60+ businesses, preserving 15,000+ acres, creating 250+ annual jobs, and unlocking \$25M+ in debt capital for investment-ready businesses — operationalizes the top of the funnel; Fullerfield Capital deploys against that readied pipeline.

Metric	Year 1	Year 3	Year 5	Cumulative 5-yr
Deployable AUM (\$M)	40	130	240	—
Annual deployment (\$M)	18	52	82	240
# active loans	14	48	95	160 origin.
Farms financed (succession)	4	16	32	68
Infra facilities financed	2	7	14	30
CPG brands financed	8	25	49	108
Acres under regen. stewardship	2,500	9,500	18,500	—
Jobs supported (direct+indirect)	85	340	690	—
Portfolio gross yield (target)	—	—	—	7.0–8.5%
Net yield to LPs (target)	—	—	—	5.5–6.5%

Yield targets are modeled on a portfolio-weighted basis across the three product lines. Succession loans anchor the portfolio at sub-market but stable yields appropriate to their patience profile; infrastructure mezzanine carries the middle of the yield curve; CPG working capital contributes the highest nominal yields with the shortest tenor. Loss assumptions: 1.2% cumulative five-year portfolio loss in the base case, stress-tested to 3.5%.

Accelerated case. A coalition approach — Fullerfield plus one or two peer regional funds, deeper CDFI balance-sheet partnership, and an incremental federal tranche in the next farm bill — closes the gap by 2032 and creates headroom for the next decade of Northeast regenerative expansion. This requires coordinated LP commitments on a timeline that is tighter than a single fund cycle, but is within reach.

X. RISK FRAMEWORK

What we worry about, and how we mitigate it

Risk category	Principal exposure	Mitigation
Agricultural price & weather	Dairy, specialty crops, livestock revenue volatility	Diversified portfolio; DSCR sized to trough-cycle cash flow; insurance covenants
Interest-rate & re-fi	Rate reset in senior tranche during long-tenor succession loans	Rate-cap or hedge overlay for succession product; ladder origination
Regulatory & policy	Farm bill reauthorization; state-level succession tax treatment	Co-origination with FSA-guaranteed structures; state-level advocacy via Foundation
Brand execution (CPG)	Founder dependency; retailer concentration; slotting over-commit	Revenue-linked triggers; retailer-mix covenants; co-underwrite with natural-channel veterans
Infrastructure execution	Construction overruns; operator throughput below design	Fixed-price contracts; staged draws; ramp covenants; third-party operator partnerships
Liquidity / portfolio	Mismatch between long-tenor assets and LP liquidity preferences	Hold-to-maturity structure; portfolio-level evergreen or capital-recycling optionality
Climate-transition	Shifting growing zones, extreme-weather clustering	Regenerative-practices covenant itself is a climate mitigation; soil-health underwriting credit
Capital-source dependency	Over-reliance on a single LP cohort	Blended stack: foundation PRIs, family office, pension/endowment, CDFI co-lend

The risk framework is deliberately conventional. Nothing about financing regional food systems requires exotic risk-management; what it requires is a lender that knows the operating reality of the underlying borrowers and prices capital to that reality rather than to a generalized emerging-market discount. Fullerfield's originators and credit team come from Farm Credit, CDFI, natural-channel operator, and institutional-ag-lending backgrounds for this reason.

XI. THE FULLERFIELD APPROACH

Capital and Foundation, operating as one system

Fullerfield is two organizations structurally and one system operationally. Fullerfield Foundation — a 501(c)(3) public charity — provides technical assistance, capacity-building grants, and investment-readiness support to regenerative farms and food businesses across the Northeast. Businesses that complete the Foundation's 12-to-18-month readiness cohort emerge with the financial infrastructure, governance, and documentation required to accept institutional debt capital. Fullerfield Capital LLC — a regulated investment vehicle — then underwrites and deploys that capital.

The pipeline between the two is Fullerfield's competitive advantage. A conventional lender encounters the Northeast food system as a set of seemingly-unbankable propositions — inadequate statements, informal governance, concentrated customer risk, covenant-breaking seasonality. The same businesses, after Foundation engagement, are underwritable with standard institutional discipline. Foundation investment is how Fullerfield converts 'structurally under-capital-served' into 'credit-worthy.'

Foundation five-year vision (restated here for LPs)

Support 60+ regenerative food and agriculture businesses. Preserve 15,000+ acres of farmland under regenerative stewardship. Create 250+ annual jobs. Unlock \$25M+ in debt capital for investment-ready businesses via Fullerfield Capital and partner lenders. Deploy 60%+ of capital and capacity-building to historically underserved entrepreneurs, including women-owned businesses, beginning farmers, rural entrepreneurs, and veterans.

How LPs engage

Fullerfield Capital's platform is structured to accept three cohorts of capital partners. Foundations and endowments aligned with regional food-system and climate mandates typically anchor the patient-capital tranche and often contribute PRI/MRI commitments alongside grants to the Foundation. Family offices with domain interest in regenerative agriculture typically commit to the blended-return tranche and are active on deal-review committees. Institutional LPs — pension, CDFI partners, selective endowment cohort — typically participate at the senior-yield end of the portfolio and access diversified exposure across succession, infrastructure, and CPG in a single commitment.

Fullerfield Capital is led by Charles Wade (Founder), with Christine Rico (CFO) and Savannah Starks (Program Director). Contact: charles@fullerfield.com.

APPENDIX

Sources, methodology notes, and disclosures

Principal sources

USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service — 2022 Census of Agriculture; Land Values 2024 Summary and 2025 state-level updates; Farm Sector Income Forecast (ERS, 2024–25). USDA Agricultural Marketing Service — Resilient Food Systems Infrastructure Program (RFSI) documentation and awards; Meat and Poultry Processing Expansion Program (MPPEP); Local Meat Capacity Grant Program (Local MCap). USDA Farm Service Agency — Farm Ownership Loans and Beginning Farmers and Ranchers Loans program descriptions. American Farmland Trust — Farms for a New Generation research; New York Farmland Access Fund documentation; succession-transition estimates. Farm Credit East — 2024 Northeast Dairy Farm Summary & 2025 Mid-Year Outlook; 2024 Northeast Economic Engine (Agriculture, Forest Products, Commercial Fishing). New England State Food System Planners Partnership — New England Feeding New England (NEFNE) Executive Summary and regional-food-share data. Organic Trade Association — 2025 Organic Industry Survey; 2025 U.S. organic marketplace growth release. Northeast Sustainable Agriculture Working Group (NESAWG) and the Wallace Center — Counting Values: Food Hub Financial Benchmarking Study. ReGen Brands Coalition and ReGen Brands Capital — coalition and capital-framework materials, 2024–2025. Acosta Group — 2025 Natural & Organic Consumer Survey.

Methodology notes

Geographic scope: U.S. Census Northeast — 9 states (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT). Time horizon: cumulative demand, 2026–2036. Currency: 2025 USD unless otherwise noted. Segment estimates are constructed bottoms-up from public sources and reconciled to sum to \$2.3B; individual segment figures are rounded to the nearest \$10M for presentation. Scenario projections assume continued public funding at current authorization levels, continued growth in regenerative-claim CPG volume at a decelerating CAGR, no material macroeconomic or policy dislocation, and no catastrophic multi-year climate event unique to the Northeast. Portfolio-yield and loss assumptions are modeled, not contracted, and are illustrative of a target vehicle rather than a commitment of any specific fund.

Important disclosures

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